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Chapter 5: Conceptualising the Regular-Irregular Engagement: 
The Strategic Value of Proxies and Auxiliaries in Wars amongst the People 
 
Vladimir Rauta 
 
Introduction 
 
The notion of ‘war amongst the people’ is a central feature of the twenty-first century 
security environment. Introduced by Rupert Smith in his ground-breaking The Utility of 
Force,1 ‘war amongst the people’ captured a reality long in the making, whose historical 
lineage could partly be traced back to the origins of war itself. The appeal of the concept 
came from combining the simplicity of the label with its strong analytical power. Smith 
shifted the strategic mindset towards the socio-political construction of violence in a way that 
allowed Western strategic thinking to grasp realities that did not conform to mainstream 
strategic expectations: first, the transformation of civil society into a battlespace dominated 
by fragmented non-state actors pursuing various and often contradictory political goals; 
second, the blurring of key strategic conceptual binaries such as ‘peace–war’ or ‘victory–
defeat’ and third the increasing media visibility of such development and interactions and its 
taxing pressures on policy and decision-makers.  
 
In doing so, Smith identified ‘the people’ as the locus and animus of fighting and made the 
case for the absence of any form of boundaries around them, physical or not. More recently, 
Thomas Marks and Paul Rich described the value of violence in war amongst the people as a 
                                                          
1 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 
2006). 
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twofold process: ‘to carry out the normal functions of military warfighting, neutralisation of 
the armed capacity of the enemy; but, more fundamentally, to carve out the space necessary 
for the political activities of (alternative) state-building achieved through mobilisation and 
construction of capacity’.2 This shows how ‘the people’ became the object of contention or 
what needed to be won over, while Western strategic thinking adopted the famous ‘hearts and 
minds’ model to varying degrees of success.  
 
This chapter addresses a significant gap in this debate by looking at how these wars are often 
fought against an adversary; not just amongst the people, but with and alongside the people. 
To highlight the intricacies of war amongst the people, it identifies two complementary 
strategic models of integrating ‘the people’ into warfighting: the auxiliary strategic model 
and the proxy strategic model, both of which speak to different patterns of interaction 
between regular and irregular forces. The former delineates a close regular–irregular military 
synergy in which the irregulars complement the regulars and are usually co-employed in the 
fighting. The latter describes a strategic relationship of political and military value in which 
the irregulars work for the regulars through a process of delegation. The chapter, therefore, 
builds a case for differencing proxies from auxiliaries, based on the former’s politico-
strategic role compared to the latter’s military-tactical utility. To capture these differences, 
the argument presents the proxy and auxiliary relationships as variations of dynamic and 
flexible strategic interaction processes between types of forces (regular and irregular). 
 
Historically, both models demonstrate strategic appeal. The auxiliary model can be traced 
back to the 17th century, continuing into the 19th century with partisans acting in concert 
                                                          
2 Thomas Marks and Paul Rich, ‘Back to the Future: People’s War in the 21st Century’, Small 
Wars and Insurgencies 28:3 (2017), 409-25.  
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with emerging European armies and in many wars of colonial domination.3 The proxy model 
also has a rich historical tradition which reaches fruition with the Cold War and its ensuing 
superpower confrontation, which plunged the so-called Third World into the hot wars of the 
era.4 Both models survived the post-Cold War security environment and have become a 
staple of recent military adventurism in the Middle East and South and Central Asia. 
However, their strategic appeal (even less the strategic differences between auxiliaries and 
proxies) are seldom discussed comparatively, if at all.5 As Scheipers observed about 
auxiliaries, ‘the failure of Western officers and strategic thinkers to engage in a debate over 
the strategic value of native auxiliaries is puzzling, given the ubiquity with which local 
                                                          
3 Beatrice Heuser (ed), Small Wars and Insurgencies in Theory and Practice, 1500-1850 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2017). 
4 See Geraint Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics 
(Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012); Michael A. Innes (ed), Making Sense of Proxy 
Wars: States, Surrogates and the Use of Force (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2012); 
Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare (London: Polity, 2013); Seyom Brown, ‘Purposes and 
Pitfalls of War by Proxy: A Systemic Analysis’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 27:2 (2016), 
243-57; Andreas Krieg, ‘Externalizing the Burden of War: the Obama Doctrine and US 
Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, International Affairs 92:1 (2016), 97-113; Alex Marshall, 
‘From Civil War to Proxy War: Past History and Current Dilemmas’, Small Wars and  
Insurgencies 27:2 (2016), 183-95.  
5 Vladimir Rauta, ‘Proxy Agents, Auxiliary Forces, and Sovereign Defection: Assessing the 
Outcomes of Using Non-State Actors in Civil Conflicts’, Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies 16:1 (2016), 91-111. 
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auxiliaries were – and continue to be – used’.6 This chapter addresses this gap and uses 
Afghanistan’s history of war as a theory-building case study.  
 
Afghanistan’s war history is instructive in multiple ways. First, through its long history of 
military interventions and civil war, it has become a paradigmatic case of ‘war amongst the 
people’. From the 19th century British and Russian imperialist interventions to the decade-
long Soviet agony prefacing the end of the Cold War, through to the post-9/11 American 
interventionist failure, Afghanistan has become synonymous with complicated violent 
people’s struggles leading to the impossibility of success and the certainty of defeat. The 
Taliban conform to Smith’s prototype of insurgents who integrate the ‘people’ in a complex 
manner and by blurring the civilian-military distinction. While hierarchically structured, the 
movement comprises various networks, such as that led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, or integrates 
a complicated web of regional and provincial tribes, such as those of Baz Mohammed and 
Mansoor Dadullah.7 More importantly, current conflict resolution approaches have favoured 
peace deals and a welcoming of the Taliban to the negotiating table. These developments 
come against the background of a recent Taliban resurgence,8 which has legitimised the 
                                                          
6 Sibylle Scheipers ‘Counterinsurgency or Irregular Warfare? Historiography and the Study 
of Small Wars’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 25:5/6 (2014), 879-99.  
7 Theo Farrell and Michael Semple, ‘Making Peace with the Taliban’, Survival 57:6 (2015), 
79-110.  
8 Reuters, ‘Afghan Taliban Launch Spring Offensive as US Reviews Strategy’, Reuters 28 
April 2017 available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban/afghan-
taliban-launch-spring-offensive-as-u-s-reviews-strategy-idUSKBN17U0E9 accessed 17 
October 2018. 
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group in the on-going peace talks.9 As Afghan President Ashraf Ghani observed during 2018, 
it is the Afghan people who demanded peace in the hope that decades of war amongst the 
Afghan people make way for decades of future peace.10 
 
Second, Afghanistan’s historical trajectory has been widely presented as having been shaped 
by regional and international geopolitical struggles. This gave rise to the mainstream 
argument that Afghanistan devolved from a somewhat sovereign buffer state into a war-torn 
proto-state, manned by warlords and violent factions that were always willing to barter the 
future of the country. This has translated into analyses of Afghan violence that use the labels 
‘proxy’ and ‘auxiliary’ in an interchangeable fashion and with significant analytical 
consequences. This is even more puzzling as Afghanistan has been subject to a vast array of 
scholarship that has analysed its violence on macro, meso and micro levels. As will be 
demonstrated, the employment of local forces as either auxiliary or proxies11 and the 
disregard of their core differences led to significant setbacks on the battlefield, be it political 
or military. Not every local force or militia working with or for the regular forces was always 
a proxy, nor was it always an auxiliary. The two models of regular-irregular interaction co-
                                                          
9 Hekmat Khalil Karzai, ‘An Unprecedented Peace Offer to the Taliban’, New York Times 12 
March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/opinion/peace-taliban.html accessed 17 
October 2018.  
10 Ashraf Ghani, ‘I will negotiate with the Taliban anywhere’, The New York Times 27 June 
2018 available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/opinion/ashraf-ghani-afghanistan-
president-peace-talks-taliban-.html accessed on 17 October 2018. 
11 Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Women and Pipelines. Afghanistan’s Proxy Wars’, International Affairs 
73:2 (1997), 283-96. 
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existed and, by providing a trans-historic analysis, the chapter seeks to theorise this often-
recurring problem.12  
 
Overall the chapter seeks to present the proxy-auxiliary issue as part of the broader narrative 
of war amongst the people. By underlying their fundamentally strategic differences, the 
argument developed here tentatively helps to overcome problems surrounding issues such as 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism13, or democratisation and reconstruction,14 all of 
                                                          
12 Stephen Biddle, ‘Afghanistan's Legacy: Emerging Lessons of an Ongoing War’, The 
Washington Quarterly 37:2 (2014), 73-86. 
13 David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy’, Orbis  53:2 
(2009), 319-36; Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, ‘Campaign disconnect: operational 
progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011’, International Affairs 87:2 
(2011), 271–96; Robert Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British 
counterinsurgency?’, International Affairs 87:2 (2011), 297-315; Stuart Griffin, ‘Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to 
stabilization’, International Affairs 87:2 (2011), 317-33; Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, 
‘The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012’, International Affairs 89:4 
(2013), 845-71.  
14 Peter Marsden, ‘Afghanistan: the Reconstruction Process’, International Affairs 79:1 
(2003), 91-105; Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Transnational Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan’, 
International Affairs 79:3 (2003), 567-81; Jan Angstrom, ‘Inviting the Leviathan: external 
forces, war, and state-building in Afghanistan’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 19:3 (2008), 
374-96; Toby Dodge, ‘Intervention and dreams of exogenous statebuilding: the application of 
Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Review of International Studies 39 (2013), 
1189-1212; David Romano, Brian Calfano and Robert Phelps, ‘Successful and Less 
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which have revolved around the centrality of the ‘people’. Finally, given the recent advent in 
the practice of proxy wars, with wars such as those in Syria, Ukraine, Yemen or South 
Sudan,15 and considering the growing use of auxiliary forces in recent counterinsurgency 
campaigns, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria,16 the chapter furthers the understanding of 
the strategic differences between the two roles – proxy and auxiliary – as part of the volume’s 
aim to conceptualise and clarify the ever-present puzzles of contemporary war amongst the 
people.  
 
The chapter unfolds in two parts. First, it presents the theoretical argument. Here the focus is 
on drawing a theoretical demarcation line between the auxiliary and the proxy model by 
employing the strategic interaction framework. Simply put, strategic interaction refers to a 
decision-making process in which one actor’s options and decisions are taken in relationship 
with another’s alternatives and commitments.17 The choice of this framework is not 
incidental, but rather speaks to the core of Smith’s conceptualisation of war amongst the 
people as essentially complex political processes. A second substantive section uses 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Successful Interventions: Stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan’, International Studies 
Perspectives 16 (2015), 388-405. 
15 Vladimir Rauta and Andrew Mumford, ‘Proxy Wars and the Contemporary Security 
Environment’ in Robert Dover, Huw Dylan and Michael S. Goodman (eds), The Palgrave 
Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 99-116.  
16 Kevin Koehler, Dorothy Ohl and Holger Albrecht, ‘From Disaffection to Desertion: How 
Networks Facilitate Military Insubordination in Civil Conflict’, Comparative Politics 48:4 
(2016), 439-57. 
17 David A. Lake and Robert Powell (eds) Strategic Choice and International Relations, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3.  
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Afghanistan as a theory building case and tracks the historical evolution of the proxy and 
auxiliary strategic models.18  
 
The Missing Link: Strategy, Proxies and Auxiliaries 
 
The attempt to use the strategic interaction framework in order to explain variation in the 
employment of irregulars in operations with regular forces follows a recent, albeit slow, turn 
in conflict research.19 More widely, however, it responds to both a call for abandoning non-
strategic analyses of wars20 and the need to think creatively about political violence in 
contemporary conflicts.21 To assess the proxy-auxiliary difference through the idea of 
‘strategy’ might seem futile, given the latter’s controversial nature. Strachan famously 
decried the loss of meaning of ‘strategy’ and its ever-growing banal use,22 while Freedman 
postulated, at the very beginning of his study, Strategy: A History, that ‘there is no agreed-
                                                          
18 Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 2011); Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in the 
9/11 Wars (Yale: Yale University Press, 2017).  
19 Belgin San-Akca, States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
20 David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two: A 
Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53:4 
(2009), 570-97. 
21 Paul Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders’, Perspectives on Politics 
10:2 (2012), 243-64 
22 Hew Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, Survival 47:3 (2005), 34.  
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upon definition of strategy that describes the field and limits its boundaries’.23 Without 
bypassing the importance of this debate,24 the chapter employs Betts’ definition of strategy as 
‘the link between military means and political means, the scheme for how to make one 
produce the other’.25 What is relevant from the notion of ‘strategy’ is its ability to translate 
actor behaviour in a dynamic way. It simply does not assume it ex ante, but allows for intent 
to be constructed through interactions: with one’s goals and means, with one’s targets, with 
the targets’ goals and means, as well as with the context and operational environment. 
Strategy serves, therefore, because it is fundamentally relational, hence why the chapter 
draws on the theoretical value of ‘strategic interaction’. As Lake and Powell put it, strategic 
interaction refers to ‘each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how others behave, 
and, therefore each actor must take the actions of others into account’.26 
 
This framing of the proxy and auxiliary models helps to overcome difficulties arising from 
the often messy and covert processes though which irregulars assume these roles. This is 
achieved because, with strategic interaction, the focus is on how parties act, react, anticipate, 
presume or negate behaviour in relations to other actors and to the context. Critically, it links 
two problems: first, who is involved, namely the regular and irregular actors and second, why 
                                                          
23 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xi.  
24 For a recent overview of the debate see Paul D. Miller, ‘On Strategy, Grand and Mundane’, 
Orbis 60:2 (2016), 237-47.  
25 Richard K. Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’, International Security 25:2 (2000), 5-50. 
26 Lake and Powell, Strategic Choice and International Relations. 
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and how they interact. As Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan argued, the failure to specify 
who fights hinders the discussion on why they do it.27  
 
This is critical to our understanding of the ‘people’ component in the overall concept of ‘war 
amongst the people’, particularly if one views the ‘people’ as more than simply the object of 
a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. Smith’s formulation of the notion aimed to capture the 
political agency of the many non-state actors and their tremendous ability to segment the 
political space in ways that states did not. From this point of view, a strategic analysis of how 
the ‘people’ contribute to fighting brings to the forefront the very issue of the agency of the 
‘people’. Accordingly, it is the strategic intent behind both actors’ behaviour and their 
individual goals that shape the choice of proxy and auxiliary, as well as their willingness to 
assume strategic responsibilities.  
 
Having explained the choice of theoretical framework and why strategic interaction works to 
explain the differences between the proxy and the auxiliary models, it is possible to 
conceptualise the two relationships thus: proxy forces serve a politico-strategic role, whereas 
auxiliaries present a military-tactical value. This is consistent with the limited attempts in the 
literature to distinguish between the two types of force.28 On the one hand, auxiliaries have 
been defined as ‘military forces that support the military efforts of regular armed forces of a 
                                                          
27 Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War 
Duration and Outcome’, 571. 
28 Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).  
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state’29, while, on the other, proxy forces have been defined through the wider phenomenon, 
namely proxy war. This has been defined as ‘the indirect engagement in a conflict by third 
parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome’.30 The definition is also complemented by 
what can be called a structural definition, one that presents the unique structuring of a proxy 
war as a relationship between ‘a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the 
dynamic of an existing conflict, and their chosen proxies, who are the conduit for weapons, 
training and funding from the benefactor’.31   
 
To better underline the fact that proxy forces serve a politico-strategic role (whereas 
auxiliaries present a military-tactical value), the chapter draws two modes of interaction that 
demonstrate the differences in employing proxies and auxiliaries, by showing how they either 
conserve or modify the number of parties involved in fighting [see Figures 2 & 3 below]. The 
emphasis here is on how the parties interact and not on why they engage in such roles or, for 
that matter, to what end. The literature provides some answers,32 yet a full discussion of the 
questions of why and to what end exceeds the limits of this chapter. For example, research 
has shown that a proxy war is the result of a colluding effort,33 understood as a form of covert 
                                                          
29 Sibylle Scheipers, ‘Irregular Auxiliaries after 1945’, The International History Review 39:1 
(2017), 14-29. 
30 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 1.  
31 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 11. 
32 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 13.  
33 Paul Staniland, ‘Armed Groups and Militarized Elections’, International Studies Quarterly 
59 (2015), 694–705. 
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delegation of violence ‘often entailing specific cooperative modalities’.34 In terms of their 
purpose, the literature has used the case of the Russian annexation of Crimea to note that 
auxiliaries played ‘the role of justifying and legitimizing the intervention with their actions 
being portrayed as supportive to the covert military intervention.’35  
 
With a focus on how the regular-irregulars interact, it is necessary to distinguish between 
proxy forces - in which the irregulars fight the adversary for the regular forces- and auxiliary 
forces, where the irregulars fight the adversary with and alongside the regulars. In the case of 
the proxy forces, the fighting dynamic is altered because the fighting between the regulars 
and their targets is shifted onto the proxy. This is why proxy forces modify the number of 
parties involved in fighting, effectively shifting the burden of war. Conversely, in the case of 
auxiliary forces, these do not change the nature of who engages the adversary because they 
act as force multipliers – in the same or in a different theatre – for the regulars. That is why 
they conserve the number of parties involved in fighting. An auxiliary becomes part of a 
direct, overt alliance where the effort of the third party is cooperatively integrated into that of 
the party requesting it. There are many historical examples of campaigns involving 
auxiliaries: tribal chiefs working with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) against 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe; the Mau Mau Kikuyu auxiliaries helping the British Army during the 
Mau Mau uprising in Kenya; the Tropas Nomadas assisting the Spanish in Western Sahara 
and the tirailleur regiments, the moghnaznis, or the harkis fighting alongside the French in 
Algeria. 
 
                                                          
34 Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca, ‘Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups 
(NAGs), 1946–2001’, International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), 721. 
35 Rauta, ‘Proxy Agents, Auxiliary Forces, and Sovereign Defection’.  
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Figure 2:  Party Interaction in Proxy Wars 
 
 
Figure 3: Party Interaction with Auxiliary Employment 
 
 
 
What is particular to the proxy model is that the relationship between the Beneficiary, Proxy 
Actor and Target results in an overlap of three interactions: the Beneficiary-Target (the 
lighter circle in Figure 2), the Beneficiary-Proxy Agent (the semi-dotted circle in Figure 2) 
and the Proxy Agent-Target (the darker circle in Figure 2). The specificity of the proxy 
model is that it amounts to a proxy war: the indirect projection of violence onto the 
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Beneficiary-Target interaction via the Proxy Agent-Target interaction through the 
Beneficiary-Proxy Agent interaction. This is different to the employment of an auxiliary, 
which does not result in the formation of a distinct war but marks direct, cooperative strategic 
behaviour. In fact, throughout history, the degree of collaboration with the auxiliaries saw 
their quasi-assimilation into army ranks, such as the role of Native Americans before and 
during the American War of Independence (1775-83). Here, the combination of European 
conventional forces with unconventional auxiliaries was common; George Washington’s 
success in Carolina owed much to the employment of irregulars under and alongside his 
regular soldiers. Moreover, accounts of the war emphasise how the British found themselves 
entrapped ‘by the all too often formidable combination of the regular Continental Army 
screened and supported by militias’.36  
 
In highlighting this positional understanding of the differences between proxy and auxiliaries 
the chapter moves the debate beyond its current treatment of the issues according to which 
auxiliaries are essentially ‘distinct from proxies, which are defined as receiving merely 
indirect support’.37 In doing so, it addresses the under-studied character of the problem and 
places it into the broader issue of war amongst the people.38  
 
The chapter now turns to placing its theoretical observations into an empirical setting, namely 
Afghanistan and its long history of people’s wars. As one of the paradigmatic contemporary 
cases of war amongst the people, Afghanistan witnessed both a conventionally soldier-heavy, 
                                                          
36 Jeffrey Record, ‘External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success’, Parameters XXXVI:3 
(2006), 36-49.   
37 Scheipers, ‘Irregular Auxiliaries after 1945’, 16. 
38 Scheipers, ‘Irregular Auxiliaries after 1945’, 14. 
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regular military strategy39 and a light footprint one, to which irregulars were key. Recent 
research has argued that the failure to address the Afghan strategic challenges post 9/11 was 
due in part to the reliance on security partnership with local allies whose unreliability became 
a strategic liability.40 In drawing the proxy-auxiliary difference, the chapter points to the 
significance of this discussion as addressing a key determinant of success in contemporary 
war by offering an explanatory variant which underlies the importance of the distinction to 
successful warfighting.  
 
 
The Proxy and Auxiliary Models in Practice: Afghanistan’s Wars amongst the People 
 
As Ayub and Kouvo argued, despite being richly documented, Afghanistan’s wars are yet to 
be very well understood.41 This can be observed in an oft-encountered push for explanations 
based on mere historical analogies.42 Spanning across more than two centuries, Afghanistan’s 
relationship with political violence has challenged historians, anthropologists, conflict 
                                                          
39 Artemy M. Kalinosky, A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
40 Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald and Ryan Baker, ‘Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The 
Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41:1/2 
(2018), 89-142.  
41 Fatima Ayub and Sari Kouvo, ‘Righting the course? Humanitarian intervention, the war on 
terror and the future of Afghanistan’, International Affairs 84:4 (2008), 641–57. 
42 Paul D. Miller, ‘Graveyard of Analogies: The Use and Abuse of History for the War in 
Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39:3 (2016), 446-76. 
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researchers, political scientists and policy-makers alike.43 In many ways its complex war 
history seems to have contradicted history’s ever-present sense of chronology, with its 
commitment to linearity and belief in progress. Critically, Afghanistan postulates historical 
repetition not as error, but as specificity. Indeed, it is now a common practice to claim that 
the history of the Afghan wars exerted a certain magnetism for major power intervention. As 
Hilali remarked, ‘since the 19th century…..Afghanistan has continued to suffer from 
superpower politics, external pressure, and chronic instability’.44 It is even more common to 
expand on the country’s ability to reject it.45 While Gibbs presented Afghanistan as one of the 
few countries in Central Asia never to be subject to direct colonial rule46, Yousaf and Adkin 
claimed that, with the exception of a shared religion, it was only foreign invaders that united 
the Afghans.47  
 
                                                          
43 Thomas J. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010); Robert C. Crews, Afghan Modern: The History of a Global Nation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
44 A. Z. Hilali, ‘The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist Coup’, The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies 18:4 (2005), 674.  
45 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2010); David Isby, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires: A New 
History of the Borderland (New York: Pegasus, 2011). 
46 David Gibbs, ‘The Peasant as Counter-Revolutionary: The Rural Origins of the Afghan 
Insurgency’, Studies in Comparative International Development 21:1 (1986), 47. 
47 Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a 
Superpower (New York: Casemate, 2001), 128. 
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What is less common is an appreciation of Afghanistan’s multitude of inter-related conflicts – 
international, national and sub-national – in a way that demonstrates that political violence, 
expressed either directly or indirectly, rarely takes place in ‘isolated pairs, but rather in a 
networked system’.48 A key feature of this problem is the treatment of the uses and roles of 
the irregulars as proxy and auxiliaries in Afghan wars in a literature that otherwise has 
produced a veritable exegesis of its subject. It has so far been embedded in the broad 
narratives of strategic struggles: expansionist, geopolitical, ideological and religious. This 
marginalised the key differences between proxies and auxiliaries, as well as the conditions 
allowing for the two strategic models to evolve: the extensive Afghan tribal factionalism 49 
and the structuring of social practices into kinship-based, patron-client relationships.  
 
Taken together, these have placed the Afghans at the centre of a stream of wars waged 
against, with, for, amongst and alongside them. The Afghan people accommodated, waged 
and distributed violence among their patrons and between themselves, outside and alongside 
their customary practice of badal (vendetta)50 or tarburwali (cousin rivalry).51 Yet most 
analyses paint the Afghans as insurgents, with the existing appreciation of the Afghan 
                                                          
48 Sarah E. Croco and Tze Kwang Teo, ‘Assessing the Dyadic Approach to Interstate Conflict 
Processes: A.k.a. “Dangerous” Dyad-Years’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 22:5 
(2005), 5-18. 
49 Hilali, ‘The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist Coup’, 680; see also 
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire. Understanding the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier’, International Security 32:4 (2008), 41-77. 
50 Gibbs, ‘The Peasant as Counter-Revolutionary’, 43.  
51 Matthew Fielden and Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Beyond the Taliban? The Afghan Conflict and 
United Nations Peacemaking’, Conflict, Security and Development 1:3 (2001), 5-32.  
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irregular effort generically linked to the country’s Cold War struggle, which has now become 
synonymous with the country’s origins of proxy wars. That Afghanistan, ‘more than any 
other location, was the high point of the Cold War’,52 is common knowledge, with the 
mujahedeen’s fight against the Soviets central to any study of Cold War historiography. 
Galster, prefacing the National Security Archive’s online volume of declassified documents, 
Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War, called it the ‘battleground for the bloodiest 
superpower proxy war of the 1980s’.53 Similarly, Blum argued that ‘Afghanistan was a cold-
warrior’s dream: The CIA and the Pentagon, finally, had one of their proxy armies in direct 
confrontation with the forces of the Evil Empire’.54  
 
However, by the time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, precipitating another West-East 
proxy war, the Afghan warriors found themselves in a familiar situation, albeit a century 
apart. The 19th century saw Afghanistan develop as a buffer state between the British and 
Russian empires. The second half of the chapter begins by presenting the proxy strategic 
model starting with the Soviet intervention of 1979. Against this background the auxiliary 
model will be compared and contrasted, observing the theoretical differences explained 
previously. Understanding the contemporary value of the two strategic models requires a 
longer historical perspective because it allows the development of an understanding of 
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proxies and auxiliaries that is not context dependent, but instead shows their strategic utility 
through time. 
 
Rubin’s exceptional study on the transformation of Afghanistan over the last few decades 
argued that the country’s encounters with the phenomenon of proxy war – and thus with the 
first strategic model presented here – began with the Cold War.55 The key event is the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Afghanistan’s geographical positioning vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union had always produced a special relationship56and the threat of losing the country 
to the Americans altered the Soviet view of the strategic context, pushing for direct military 
intervention.57 After all, the Chinese absorbed Tibet in 1951 and the US ran a path-breaking 
proxy war in Guatemala in 1954. Having an assertive power policy concerning one’s own 
backyard – or front yard – was an ordering principle of the Cold War. For the US, on the 
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other hand, Afghanistan, by itself, was of little importance.58 However, the loss of Iran as 
their ‘policeman’ in the Middle East, following the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, 
and the prospects of the Soviets becoming entangled in a Vietnam war of their own, informed 
the decision to be ‘more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their 
country’s independence’.59 These were the mujahedeen, holy warriors aggregated in small 
battalions or jabhas60 that would become, next to the contras in Nicaragua, the most 
recognisable proxy actors for the US. The proxy model began with President Jimmy Carter’s 
modest efforts and was overridden by President Ronald Reagan’s outspoken and overt 
support of the mujahedeen. The outside support brought Afghanistan’s domestic conflict into 
the ‘geopolitical logic of the Cold War’61 and ensured that the process of building the 
mujahedeen army would be extensively traced.62  
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First, the weaving of the Afghan war throughout the 1980s into the broader geopolitical 
balance speaks of the politico-strategic role of the proxies, as presented previously. Indeed, 
for the US, supporting the mujahedeen was part of their strategy of managing systemic 
relations with the USSR, which culminated in National Security Directive 166, whose 
ultimate goal was ‘to push the Soviets out’.63 Second, US support consisted of military and 
financial assistance to the mujahedeen as proxies. In the context of the proposed theorisation, 
the fighters fought for the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan and did so for the US as 
well. This was not without problems. For one thing, using Pakistan as a conduit for transport 
and allocation of support diverted the strategic effort. Problems mounted as both sides 
searched for proxies. This was the case with the Hazara and the Afridi tribes, who, after being 
enlisted by the Soviets to stop the mujahedeen near the Pakistan border, turned against their 
patrons, ‘trapping the Soviets in a crossfire with the resistance’.64 Of relevance here is also 
the fact that the veiled expression of ‘defeating the Soviet infidels’ did little to help, for the 
resistance was undermined from inside by lack of unity, factionalism and splintering, as well 
as by repeated shifts in their support for each other.65 The fiercely independent nature of the 
mujahedeen proved its strategic hubris and derailed both international and regional proxy 
wars.  
 
Nevertheless, what this highlights in relation to the difference between auxiliaries and proxies 
is that the initial fighting dynamic is changed by the irregular force that assumes a grant of 
authority from a third party, whether it be the US, USSR or Pakistan. As discussed above, 
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notwithstanding the negative course the model can assume, what is significant here is the 
extension of the party interactions to the inclusion of the so-called Beneficiary. In the context 
of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the political appeal overrode concerns over potentially negative 
outcomes to such an extent that sponsorship of militias and rebels was extensive and proxy 
war networks were established not just by the US, but also by the Soviets, the Afghan 
communist government, the UK, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and China, as well as by militias 
and local tribes.66  
 
The Chinese, for example, clashing with the Soviets on ideological and territorial grounds, 
provided the mujahedeen with Chinese manufactured AK-47s.67 Interestingly, strategic 
isolation in the international system and fears of Soviet encirclement informed China’s 
involvement, despite remaining largely unacknowledged.68 The UK established a strong 
relationship with Ahmed Shah Massoud, the ‘Lion of Panjshir’.69 The Afghan government 
financed the members of the Hazara tribe who, a century before, had been bludgeoned, first 
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by the British, who punished them for refusing to sell fodder by burning their fields70, and, 
later, by Abdur Rahman when trying to forge the Afghan state. This Islamic Shiite minority 
guarded the Hindu Kush Mountains and ‘went even further and actively fought for the 
Communist government against their hereditary enemies, the Pashtun mujahedeen’.71 
However, their strategic aim was political survival and so, to maximize its success, it turned 
to the new regime in Iran. As Iran stepped in, waging yet another proxy war in this already 
complex network of conflicts, the homogeneity of the Hazaras proved essential. By 
supporting Hazara religious leaders, Iran assisted in constructing an effective political 
administration72, once again showing the politico-strategic utility of proxies. However, as the 
tribe reconfigured along ethnic roots at the expense of its religious outlook in the wake of the 
Soviet withdrawal, ‘Iran decided to accept the fact that its Hazara proxies would not be able 
to establish an Iranian-style regime in the heart of Afghanistan’.73 
 
As anticipated by the US, the Soviets had envisioned a short intervention without ever 
imagining they would be ‘involved in the middle of a civil war on extremely rugged terrain 
where the Soviets…..would carry the bulk of the combat burden’.74 Ten years later, as they 
withdrew, Afghanistan collapsed into a civil war where ‘the mujahedeen, along with the 
remnants of the army turned into feuding warlords and ethnic militias’.75 The conflict soon 
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became even more multifaceted, pulling and pushing local, national and regional actors in the 
violent web of small and quickly shifting proxy wars. As Fielden and Goodhand remarked, 
the Afghan conflict could be characterised as ‘part regional proxy war and part civil war’ for 
it has ‘shifted from a bipolar war to a multipolar regional proxy war, involving neighbouring 
powers, China, Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics’.76 Rubin expressed a similar 
view that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, multiple funding channels emerged, some of 
which involved non-state actors.77 The conflict moved from an international level with the 
end of the bipolar system, into a regional one to an extent that surpassed the regional 
involvement of the 1980s.78 The proxy relations swiftly shifted in terms of strategic content, 
pushing the war amongst the Afghan people into a veritable web of wars amongst the people 
of South and Central Asia in a way that demonstrates how the proxy model changes the 
dynamics of war amongst the people in general. While some groups, such as the one led by 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, continued their relationship with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, those led 
by Burhahuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud welcomed Russia, Iran and India and 
their own policies of covert aid, as was theorised above.79 
 
In the context of the discussion of the proxy model as part of the wider issue of war amongst 
the people, this had tremendous implications. In line with what Smith argued, the increasing 
plethora of non-state actors took a distinctively active and political role. Earlier, the chapter 
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noted Iran’s sponsorship of the Hazaras as a proxy. Before the end of the Soviet intervention, 
they had been a conduit for a proxy war against Saudi Arabia and Riyadh’s support for 
Wahhabism in Afghanistan.80 However, in search of political survival and representation, the 
Hazaras reconfigured themselves politically and socially, slowly rescinding even the indirect 
cooperation with Iran. The agency of local actors and its pursuit through strategic interaction 
is evident here, as in the case of the mujahedeen, for the Hazaras transformed the jihad of 
Hazarajat into the plight of an ethnic-based movement.81 This also qualifies the implications 
of working for a Beneficiary as a strategic model subject to volatility and rapid shifts. As 
such, by the time the US intervened in Afghanistan in 2001 and itself began providing 
support for anti-Taliban militias and warlords – albeit to a different end – a complex 
combination of states and non-state actors already had a two-decade long history of using 
proxy forces, either Afghan mujahedeen or the Taliban. Having drawn a picture of the 
evolution and implications of the proxy model, the chapter now turns to detailing the 
specificities of the auxiliary model, which became a feature of the 2001 intervention.  
 
Through its intervention in Afghanistan, the US sought to create an inhospitable base for 
extremism, which, as an aim, was different to the country’s historical experience of foreign 
interventions. The aim paled in comparison and effort to that of the Soviet Union and the fear 
of burying itself in the ‘graveyard of empires’82 impacted significantly on the shape of US 
strategy: a combination of airpower and a light footprint with the cooperation of local forces. 
Having dislodged the Taliban from the official seats of power by 2002, the war effort 
concentrated henceforth on stabilisation and defeat of an ebbing and flowing insurgency. 
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During these phases, the power of local entrepreneurs of violence was harnessed in 
accordance with the precepts of American counterinsurgency as auxiliaries. In this case, the 
Northern Alliance came to be the auxiliary prototype. However, it is important to note that 
the chapter focuses on the irregular forces that are co-opted to work with the regular one in 
what can be called informal tactical alliances and not with grass-roots forces that end up 
subordinated and embedded in local, regional or national structures of authority. This would 
be the case of the local defence forces who, as Strandquist showed, despite being effectively 
tribal militias aimed at fighting the Taliban, remained subordinated to the central government 
as part of the Community Defence Initiative.83 It also does not include official forces such as 
the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Afghan Local Police Program or the 
development and employment of the Afghan National Army (ANA) as a US auxiliary 
force.84 There is indeed considerable overlap between the roles these forces play and those of 
the irregular auxiliaries within the counterinsurgency spectrum of operations, but they are not 
the focus of this chapter.  
 
The use of irregular auxiliaries became a key provision of Western doctrine in the aftermath 
of the US intervention in Afghanistan. The 2004 Field Manual Interim 3-07.22, 
Counterinsurgency Operations highlighted the imperative to expand and employ strong and 
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able native forces.85 Similarly, the 2006 US National Security Strategy emphasised the 
importance of working with allies in order to develop capable indigenous security forces able 
to fight terrorist and insurgent threats.86 For the UK, General Sir Michael Jackson 
acknowledged that the use of local indigenous forces, either inherited or built up ab initio, 
had been of increasing importance.87 The relationship with such auxiliaries has also been 
scrutinised carefully, the role of irregulars often described as following an informal security 
and military contracting pattern run from the shadows by certain US government institutions, 
chiefly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the DoD:  
 
For more than a decade, wads of American dollars packed into suitcases, backpacks 
and, on occasion, plastic shopping bags have been dropped off every month or so at 
the offices of Afghanistan’s president — courtesy of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.88 
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Critically, however, whilst detailed, criticised or revered, a common problem was the lack of 
conceptual clarity as to both the functions the local forces carried out and their capacity to 
undertake such tasks. More precisely, their role was presented in both research and policy in 
an interchangeable fashion as either proxy or auxiliary.89 This was the case for the Northern 
Alliance and other irregulars. The baseline argument saw them operating once US airpower 
degraded the theatres of war and with US Special Forces as a screen against enemy attack.90 
In both the battle of Tora Bora and Operation Anaconda in the Shah-e-Knot valley, local 
forces were used. They were part of the light footprint strategy and were employed in various 
roles, such as launching attacks on enemy targets or, during Anaconda, to act as shock troops 
whose effort was aimed at uprooting al-Qaeda fighters from their bases. As detailed analyses 
of these key points in the war showed, the local forces’ tactical skills were critical.91 As such, 
they worked with and alongside and assumed the military-tactical value of an auxiliary as 
described above. They became part of the official US strategy as a tactical complement and, 
as such, conserved the numbers of parties involved in fighting in a different way to the proxy 
strategic model. Seen through the lens of war amongst the people the auxiliary model points 
to the emergence of multiple pathways through which the ‘people’ react to and in such war 
contexts. The general understanding of the ‘people’ as either insurgent or support base is 
changed and both the auxiliary and proxy models demonstrate how insurgencies shift as the 
fighting assumes new courses.  
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The difference between auxiliaries and proxies becomes clear during the years following the 
American intervention in 2001. While the invading regular forces developed close 
cooperation with auxiliary forces, such as the Northern Alliance, the proxy model took a 
distinctive regional turn. From the very moment the Taliban emerged victorious from the 
civil war in 1996, Pakistan assumed charge of the strategic bargaining through proxy wars to 
such an extent that violent dynamics in Afghanistan came to be all about Pakistan as well.92 
As Jones put it, ‘the link to Pakistan was not a surprise, though the reality of outside support 
was much darker’.93 Pakistan’s wielding of proxy wars was both inward and outward looking 
and saw an important shift from collusion with the heroes of the Cold War to the Taliban.94 
Internally, Pakistan was driven by the imperatives of preserving state boundaries in the face 
of secessionist threats. Preoccupation with domestic stability reacted to and made recourse of 
sub-state ethnic groupings and the Taliban came to be the response to the Pashtun problem, 
as well as an instrument of Pakistani policy.95 It was the very lens of the proxy strategic 
model that became the key to the current regional dialogue aimed at ending the Afghan-
Taliban conflict. As a response to Pakistan’s interference in the Afghan conflict, the Afghan 
government had, for a long time, supported Pakistani rebel groups, especially the Tehrik-e-
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Taliban. Using the proxy as a bargaining chip in combination with a mix of political and 
diplomatic moves, President Ghani slowly pushed for a rapprochement with Pakistan aimed 
at bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table, which currently continues to develop at a 
slow pace. By understanding the critical value of the extension of its war amongst the people 
into wars in which the people participate in various ways, Afghanistan’s president has sought 
to shift decades of wars amongst the Afghan people towards potential peace. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to use the case of Afghanistan’s wars amongst the people in order to 
determine two models of strategic interaction that have shaped both the course and outcomes 
of these conflicts. In drawing a distinction between the proxy and auxiliary models, the 
chapter emphasises the complexity of contemporary wars amongst the people, which, as 
Angstrom and Honig observed, are never conducted in a vacuum, but encompass a 
complicated set of actors who reproduce their interests in multiple ways.96 To this end, 
strategic interaction became a lens for locating the differences between the auxiliary and 
proxy models. The starting assumption was that, in the case of Afghanistan, most of the time 
auxiliaries had been conceptualised as proxies and vice-versa under the pressures of a tightly 
defined political context.97 Yet the problem was far more pressing because it ignored the 
degree to which the two sets of dynamics changed the character of war amongst the people as 
strategic environments for which strategic solutions are sought and implemented. The chapter 
shows how two models of regular–irregular interaction fragmented and segmented 
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Afghanistan and, more importantly, for how long. One of the most recent expressions of this 
fragmentation process came in April 2017, when former Afghan mujahedeen Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar issued a call for peace in Afghanistan: ‘I invite you to join the peace caravan and 
stop the pointless, meaningless and unholy war’.98 The archetype of  
 
the proxy warrior – who waged holy war against the Soviets, who tried to rule Afghanistan 
through and with Pakistani support and who finally rebelled against the Taliban – was now 
pursuing a radically different strategy: of ending wars. Such shifts demonstrate the complex 
nature of war amongst the people, which are made possible by the very extension of these 
wars though proxy and auxiliary dynamics. As they have been a feature of such wars for 
decades now, both military and scholarly thinking should assess their strategic value and, 
more importantly, their consequences, with greater precision and acuity. 
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